Professor Belani now concedes that this "category" of rights is a "poor step cousin to civil and political rights"; see also, Aarthi Belani, "The South African Constitutional Court ' Happily for "security-oriented rights" 7 jurisprudence, this ancien tendency to treat SERs as non-justiciable is gradually falling into desuetude. Indeed, no less a quasi-juridical organ than the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (hereinafter "the African Commission") furnished the rationale for this new trend. According to it, "International Law and human rights must be responsive to African circumstances. Clearly, […] economic and social rights are essential elements of human rights in Africa." 8 To its eternal credit, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter), mindful of these African circumstances, does not offer any basis for a distinction in the implementation of various categories of rights. That is why it does not dichotomize in the mode of implementation of the two categories of rights. 9 Interestingly, current trends in the constitutionalisation of rights points to an increasing awareness of the cogency of the case for the domestic judicial enforcement of all categories of rights. Recent examples can be found in some African Constitutions like South Africa; Uganda; Ghana; Malawi. 10 Two recent Constitutions have even opted for a revolutionary posture capable of rendering the 5 Indeed, it was even forgotten that one of the characteristics that distinguish the ACHPR from the ECHR and ACHR is the Charter's amalgamation of all categories of rights into one document, see M. von der Linde; also, Chidi A. Odinkalu, "Analysis of Paralysis", Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2000) 2, p. 339, <muse.jhu.edu/journals/human rights quarterly/yo23/23.2 odinkalu.htm>. 
